Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Good Governance

A Monograph

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As PRTs formed prior to doctrine for building governance, the study asks, "Do US PRT models contain the structure necessary for building good governance?" This study examines the military's and other governmental agencies' definitions and methods for building good governance. It then evaluates Iraqi and Afghanistan PRT models to determine if they contain the structure necessary for building good governance while minimizing financial and force structure costs for the US Military.

The analysis finds that both the Iraqi and Afghanistan PRT models lack the necessary structure to complete their mission of building governance. As both PRT contain different strengths, the study recommends combining those strengths to generate an organization more capable of building governance. It also recommends a more comprehensive definition for governance.

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ABSTRACT

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
by MAJ John H. Ebbighausen, North Carolina Army National Guard, 50 pages.

The United States has witnessed a change in its approach to warfare. The former approach focused on breaking the enemy's will to fight while leaving the governing process intact. The new approach focuses on replacing the standing government with a new democratic model. The US military created multiple Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRTs) to assist in the process of building the new model. Several years later, the US Military developed doctrine describing how to accomplish the task.

As PRTs formed prior to doctrine for building governance, the study asks, "Do US PRT models contain the structure necessary for building good governance?" This study examines the military's and other governmental agencies' definitions and methods for building good governance. It then evaluates Iraqi and Afghanistan PRT models to determine if they contain the structure necessary for building good governance while minimizing financial and force structure costs for the US Military.

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INTRODUCTION

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are critical to twenty-first century warfare. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that current conflicts requiring counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations (SO) will continue throughout the 21st century.[1] Although not titled nation building, COIN operations support creating a stable environment for effective governance. The Army's COIN Manual (FM 3-24) lists governance as one of the Logical Lines of Operation (LLO) for counter-insurgency.[2] PRTs are responsible for building governance at the provincial level.

The DOD and DOS have created several different Joint Interagency PRT models in Iraq and Afghanistan. The monograph seeks to answer the question: "Do US PRT models contain the structure necessary for building good governance?" The question arises from the problem that PRTs were created before military doctrine or DOS policy defining techniques for building governance. Therefore, DOD developed one PRT for Afghanistan while DOS created a different model for Iraq. Both of which were developed in a COIN environment for the unique and complex task of building governance. Now that DOD has developed Doctrine for building governance, it becomes imperative to examine the effectiveness of the various models utilizing doctrine.

The monograph begins with identifying the changing nature of war and the requirement for a new organization to address the changes. Next, it reviews current DOD doctrine describing PRT functions and structure. The monograph continues with defining good governance. A definition of governance is necessary to determine which PRT model contains the most suitable

[1] Robert Gates, *The Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), X. Available from the DOD at http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. Accessed 14 Feb 2010.

[2] Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 5.3.

structure for accomplishing its mission. The doctrinal definition for governance relies on an understanding of the state. It becomes necessary to depart from doctrine to gain a better understanding. Authors such as Max Weber provide theories about the state to support this understanding. [3] Unfortunately, a definition of good governance does not provide a mechanism for its creation. An examination of DOD publications and Department of State policy provides guidance on how to build governance.[4] A reliance on how to build good governance provides a metric for comparing different US PRT models. The metric examines a PRT's structure to determine its suitability for building governance rather than trying to measure what the organization has accomplished.

With a metric in hand, it is possible to examine PRT structure to determine its suitability for building governance. Doctrinal manuals display wire diagrams suggesting PRT structure but provide insufficient detail to determine the organization's personnel requirements.[5] The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) PRT Playbook provides more depth than doctrine, but still falls short of tying individual positions to their role in building governance.[6] The 189th Infantry Brigade (Training Support) of the First US Army is responsible for assembling and training Afghanistan PRTs. Unclassified materials from the 189th provide detailed PRT structural diagrams. As most Iraqi PRTs assemble in country, similar information was not available from other training support units.

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[3] Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* [lecture on-line]: available at http://www.ne.jp/ asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/ weber/lecture/politics_vocation.html (accessed 20 October 2009), 1.

[4] Department of the Army, *FM 3-24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter 2. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), B-1.

[5] Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), B-1.

[6] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* [handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009).

There are additional military and interagency organizations that focus on building governance. Army Special Forces may contribute to governance in foreign counties, but as many of their operations are classified, their contributions cannot be included. Likewise, the Vietnam era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) teams may have made significant contributions to the Army's theory of building governance but their results remain contentious.[7] Additionally, there are seventeen foreign PRTs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.[8] There are too many variables to compare these organizations to modern US led PRTs and therefore they are also beyond the capacity of this study.

This monograph closes the gap between PRT structure and doctrine. The gap originated from the fact that PRTs formed almost three years prior to formal doctrine defining their mission.[9] The monograph examines the PRT's structure using current doctrine for building good governance. It provides an analysis for Army Doctrine writers, DOS Foreign Services Institute (FSI) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to update Joint and Interagency doctrine and procedures. It also provides JFCOM suggestions for generating the personnel portion of a PRT Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Finally, it shows how gaps between PRT structure and doctrine make mission accomplishment on the modern battlefield a difficult task.

The Changing Nature of War

Over the last century, the United States' propensity for warfare has changed. Clausewitz states "the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to

[7] Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 101-110.

[8] Arnold Fields, Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 49.

[9] Ibid., 48.

submit."[10] In Japan and Germany, the United States broke the enemy's will to continue warfare and their governments surrendered. Even though this required an invasion in Germany and large-scale bombing in Japan, their nation's governments remained intact. The United States left armed forces in both countries to monitor its enemy, provide security, and assist with rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure and industry. The key term being "assist" as both Germany and Japan maintained their governments, institutions, and limited infrastructure and were able to rebuild with US assistance.

In the last ten years, the United States has developed a new propensity in warfare. Rather than defeating a country, it has focused on removing failing, failed, or oppressive governments. It then focuses on building governance to stabilize the country. This new propensity creates a major shift in the United States government and military paradigms. The US government no longer assists a foreign government in rebuilding its nation but becomes responsible for building the new government. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US removed key Baath Party and Taliban leadership. It created a governance vacuum hampering the nation's ability to maintain or rebuild itself. This political decision resulted in destroyed nations that required the rebuilding of government institutions from local to national levels. Unfortunately, the political leadership directing the removal of foreign governments did not fully understand the consequences of its actions. They overlooked the critical step of creating an agency capable of building a new government.

The DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies for nation building. The DOS maintains national level Embassies throughout the world while USAID assists nations with developing strong institutions.[11] However, neither agency contains the appropriate resources for the large-scale task of rebuilding an entire nation's

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[10] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 90.

[11] United States Agency for International Development, *USAID PRIMER: What we do and how we do it?* [Primer on-line] from USIAD at http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/priner.html (accessed 28 November 2009), 3.

government.[12] This asset imbalance may be a political oversight, but results in the military assuming a lead role in nation building. Perhaps no other government agency maintains the financial or personnel resources allocated to the DOD.[13] Given a change in focus, the US Military now requires a new system, process, and organization possessing the necessary skills for building governance after war.

There are historical examples that the military could use in developing the organizations to build governance. Since the 1960s, the US Military has made several attempts at conducting nation building operations. The most notable were the Vietnam Era CORDS teams. During the Vietnam War, the United States Government determined it needed a combined civilian and military (CIVMIL) organization to assist the South Vietnamese central government in extending its reach outside the capital city. It created the CORDS teams for this purpose. There are differing opinions concerning the organization's effectiveness, and discourse may have prevented the CORDS form becoming a doctrinal organization.[14] Perhaps the cost of the CORDS program prevented their doctrinal incorporation. Like most organizations, the army faces personnel or force structure limitations. The army must manage its personnel inside of the limitations to accomplish current and future missions. Establishing a new CIVMIL organization requires sacrifices or costs incurred by force structure allocations. The army may have been unwilling to incur the cost and the CORDS organization, its concept, and doctrinal development ended with

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[12]American Foreign Service Association [Article on-line] found at http://www.asfa.org/101707presupdate.cfm (accessed 27 February 2010). There are roughly 13000 career employees worldwide with 5500 Foreign Service Officers, 6000 Foreign Service Specialists, and 1500 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel.

[13] Congressional Budget Office, *Budget Authority by Function, Category and Program.xls* [Spreadsheet on-line] available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/fct.html (accessed 2 November 2009). The US Military receives almost 27% if the nation's financial resources with a average of 454.6 billion USD from 2004 to 2006 and the Department of State averages 20.2 billion USD for the same time period.

[14] Dale Andrade, *Three Lessons from Vietnam* [article on-line]: available from the Washington Post at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/28/AR2005122801144.html (accessed 20 September 2009), 1.

the Vietnam War. More recently, the US participated in operations in Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans where it focused on stability operations as opposed to nation building. The latter operations did not require a large-scale CIVMIL organization such as the CORDS.

The changing propensity in warfare has made the Nation Building task more complex for the military. The lack of personnel resources and a secure environment prevents US government organizations such as the DOS and USAID from unilaterally undertaking the Nation Building task. The lack of a doctrinal organization, training, and experience prevents the military from unilaterally conducting Nation Building. The result is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a multilateral CIVMIL solution to building good governance in less secure environments. Like the CORDS, doctrinal incorporation will determine the organization's future.

Doctrine or Organization?

The Department of Defense (DOD) generated an organization to build governance prior to creating doctrine to define its operations. The army formed Afghanistan PRTs in early 2003 while Iraqi PRTs formed late in 2005 and early 2006. The first doctrine guiding PRT operations was not published until December 2006. In 2008, the army provided further revisions. Since publication of the doctrine outlining PRT operations, there has not been a comprehensive examination of the organizations and doctrine to determine if they are mutually supporting or require modification.

Information on the early PRT establishment is sparse. Some documents suggest that it took place in 2002 in the Gardez province with little more than Civil Affairs (CA) team.[15] Other documents indicate that it took place in 2003.[16] However, none of the available documentation recorded how current PRTs were initially established and how the early PRT's structure

[15] Russel Honore; David Boslego, Forging Provincial Reconstruction Teams, *Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 44* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 85.

[16] Arnold Fields, *Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 57.

contributed to the formation of the current models. The initial concept may have been an ad hoc brainstorming process by early PRTs and senior officials or it may have been a more structured process that took place at the JFCOM. Either way, the formation of the current PRT took place more than three years before the publication of doctrine describing governance. The first doctrine mentioning PRTs and governance is the Army's Field Manual (FM) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations* printed in 2006 followed by Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations* in October 2009.

Field Manual 3-24 mentions PRT three times including the index and glossary. There is a single vignette describing both the missions of PRTs and the Vietnam era CORDS.[17] The vignette contains a brief literary description for the PRT and is by no means a doctrinal description. It merely confirms that the Army understands and agrees that the PRT mission is to enhance the legitimacy of or to build good governance by stating the following:

> "PRTs were conceived as a means to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government into the provinces of Afghanistan at a time when most assistance was limited to the nation's capital. Though PRTs were staffed by a number of coalition and NATO allied countries, they generally consisted of 50 to 300 troops as well as representatives from multinational development and diplomatic agencies."[18]

Joint Publication 3-24 provides more in-depth guidance for PRT operations. Three years after publication of the Army's counterinsurgency manual, JFCOM published JP 3-24. JP 3-24, titled *Counterinsurgency Operations* dedicated five pages to PRTs. However, guidance regarding PRT structure remained vague.[19] JP 3-24 only suggested broad concepts:

> "The organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the OE [Operations Environment], and required tasks. In addition to size, PRTs differ in roles, contractor participation, interagency participation, staff organization, and even the chain of command. Military participation, which will be driven by the

[17] Department of the Army, *FM 3-24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-12.

[18] Ibid..

[19] Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), IV.18.

> operational requirements among other considerations, is often the driving factor in PRT size."[20]

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has helped fill the doctrinal gap. Since PRT operations began three years before doctrine, First Army solicited CALL to help fill this gap. CALL has worked with PRTs in country to design a non-doctrinal pamphlet called the PRT Playbook.[21] It documents Afghanistan PRT structure, training, and operations through direct observations as well as interviews with PRT commanders. The initial Playbook has expanded to include Iraqi PRTs. Although more comprehensive than doctrinal manuals, the Playbook still does not address individual positions within a PRT's structure.

Despite the overall lack of discussion regarding PRT formation and structure, there is a consensus of the intended use of PRTs. Both JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 agree that PRTs extend the reach and capacity of the central government by building governance at the local or provincial level. JP 3-24 states,

> "A PRT is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. PRTs vary in structure, size, and mission. PRTs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate reconstruction. While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and linkages among the central government, regional, and local agencies."[22]

Therefore, taking the general consensus within available PRT's doctrinal requirements regarding good governance, it is possible to reverse engineer the PRT manpower resources needed to carry out this mission. It will then be possible to determine if the current PRT structure is appropriate or

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[20] Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), B-1.

[21] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009).

[22] Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), IV.18.

requires modification. As the DOD created PRTs prior to doctrine, the study examines PRT emergence first.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Emergence

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept existed before the designation emerged. Early teams deployed as Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). President Karzai wanted to stress the importance of reconstruction at the provincial level and changed their designations to PRTs.[23] Realizing that President Karzai had a better understanding of his population, the embassy adopted the new term. Sine then, PRT nomenclature has found its way into doctrinal manuals such as JP 3-24, but only as vignettes in the Army's FM 3-24.[24] It is important to remember that this designation may be unique to Afghanistan and Iraq where the provincial government is one-step below the national government. It may become necessary to alter the name in new campaigns to Reconstruction Teams (RTs). RTs are applicable to nations where a state government may be one-step down from the national. This designation would also support modified RTs to operate at the district, county, or municipal levels.

According to FM 3-24 and the recently published JP 3-24, the Army established PRTs as a means to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government to Afghanistan provinces at a time when assistance was limited to the nation's capital.[25] The definition is vague, but extending the legitimacy of the government requires building or co-opting provincial governments. Co-opting the current form of governance that effectively secures its population is within a PRT's reach and provides a building block for development. Removing the local

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[23] Michael J McNerney, Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle? *Parameters* (Ft Leavenworth, U.S. Government Printing Office, Winter 2005-06), 36.

[24] Headquarters, Department of Defense, *JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), Appendix B.; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3.24, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-12.

[25] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3.24, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-12.; Headquarters, Department of Defense, *JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), IV.18.

governance or its ability to secure the population creates a security vacuum favoring criminal activity or an insurgency. The PRT cannot function autonomously as it lacks sufficient personnel to secure the populace. It must operate with other military units capable of securing the local population.

The PRTs focus has changed since their creation. Early PRTs focused on quick impact projects such as rebuilding infrastructure and basic services rather than supporting the local government. This focus led to generating a PRT structure with engineers capable of contracting and supervising projects such as establishing basic services, building schools, and creating employment for the local population. Since 2006, doctrine and the PRT Playbook have changed their focus. Currently PRTs focus on assisting the government in creating organizations or institution to accomplish these tasks. It acts as a mentor to provide expertise to those organizations. Over the course of time, the PRT's focus changed from a tactical to operational level organization.

Operational level organizations such as PRTs link policy and strategic guidance to tactical operations at the provincial level.[26] The PRT playbook states "Although PRTs mostly focus on the operational and tactical level, the interagency nature of their structure and activities cuts across any number of sectors (security, governance, and economy) and must be aligned with corresponding national and sector efforts."[27] PRT commanders and staff combine policy guidance from the US Embassy and strategic guidance from military leaders. They must understand the national vision and the needs of their province. PRT commanders must use this vision to assist

[26] Headquarters, Department of Defense, *JP 3.0: Joint Operations, Incorporating Change 1 (*Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008), Chapter 4. The embassy generates grand strategy incorporating all elements of national power. Military strategy is only on consideration for a PRT and as an interagency team, it must also account for the diplomatic, economic, and information strategies.

[27] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 13. [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009).

provincial leaders in generating long-term plans. Despite a lack of doctrine, it appears that PRT developers understood the organization's operational role on the battlefield.

Local security determines a PRT's composition. The PRT concept formed in combat zones and the available local security partially determined their composition. As the primary goal is to extend the national government's reach to the provincial level, the security in each province determines the PRT's composition. In areas with limited conflict such as Afghanistan after the Taliban's defeat, a small self-contained PRT may be sufficient for rebuilding the local government. In areas where civil wars, insurgencies, or criminal activities prevail, it may be necessary to embed the PRT with a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Embedding results in a smaller PRT as the BCT provides logistics, life support, and security.

The US employs several PRT models in current operations depending on the availability of ground security forces. US doctrine employs ground units as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) consisting of approximately 3,400 personnel. During PRT formation, there were only two BCTs operating or providing security for over ten provinces in Afghanistan. [28] The result was the need for a self-contained and self-securing PRT that could operate autonomously at the provincial level. This organization required a CIVMIL footprint of approximately ninety personnel. Violence or lack of security in Iraq led to the use of a larger number of BCTs to secure the population.[29] The BCTs subdivided Iraq into Areas of Operations (AORs). Iraqi PRTs no longer had to operate autonomously. This reduced the PRT size to approximately 12 to 35 personnel. The PRT embedded with a BCT relied on the larger organization's staff to for life support,

[28]Arnold Fields, Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (Washington: Office of the SICGAR, 2009), 16. From June 2005 to June 2008 there were only two US BCT sized elements in Afghanistan located in Regional Commands East and Central.

[29]Global Security.org, US Forces Order of Battle. [Accessed online] from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ops/images/oif2-rot.gif (accessed 27 November 2009). When Iraqi PRTs formed in 2004, there were 11 US BCTs in country conducting security operations.

logistics, and security. The embedded model extends the total PRT footprint to over 3,400 personnel, or approximately thirty-four times larger than the Afghanistan model.

Multiple PRT models demonstrate the lack of detailed doctrine. Doctrine such as an Army Field Manual (FM) or Joint Publication (JP) is responsible for standardizing operations.[30] JP 3-24 states, "The organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the OE and required tasks. In addition to size, PRTs differ in roles, contractor participation, interagency participation, staff organization, and even the chain of command. Military participation, which will be driven by the operational requirements and force structure considerations, is often the driving factor in PRT size."[31] DOD doctrine for PRTs lacks sufficient detail to generate a standard organization. This begs the question, "Will PRTs become a doctrinal organization or are they simply a band-aid for the current conflict?" After seven years of continuous use and the lack of doctrine formation, the future of PRTs is suspect.

PRTs must understand the meaning of good governance in order to accomplish their mission. Both stability and COIN operations manuals contain definitions and approaches for building governance. PRTs must combine portions of each doctrine while seeking some non-doctrinal definitions to gain an understanding of governance.

Defining Good Governance

The problem in determining the appropriate PRT structure for building governance centers on the fundamental question -- "what constitutes good governance?" Although there are many examples of good governance throughout the world, a specific definition is harder to pin down. Political scientists label different forms of governance, but try not to define them as good

[30] Headquarters, Department of Defense, *JP 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 171. Doctrine – Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

[31] Headquarters, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), B-1.

or bad, merely effective or ineffective.[32] Fortunately, the United Nations and Army Field Manuals provide more guidance.

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) links good governance to decision making. It states, "Governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)."[33] The article lists governance as a process of decision-making and then addresses actors responsible for the process. It suggests government, property owners, associations of farmers, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), religious leaders, political parties, or the military may singularly or collectively be part of the decision making process.[34] Therefore, identifying good governance is a difficult and complex task based on societal inputs from multiple perspectives. The problem is similar to discussions about pornography. Army leaders lack a good definition, but claim they will know it when they see it. Perhaps the DOD definition provides more insight.

FM 3-07 (Stability Operations) provides a definition for governance that links it to the state. The FM defines governance as, "The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and balance by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority."[35] This definition requires an understanding of the state. As the FM does not go further to define the state, it becomes necessary to peruse a non-doctrinal approach.

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[32] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society*, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1996), 7.

[33] UNESCAP, What is Good Governance? [Article on-line] available at http:www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (accessed 26 February 2010).

[34] Ibid.

[35] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), Glossary-5.

Max Weber defines the state in relation to its ability to legitimately use force. Early theories such as those posed by Trotsky argues that, "Every state is founded on force."[36] Max Weber expands this theory by stating, "If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,' in the specific sense of this word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state--nobody says that--but force is a means specific to the state."[37] People use their strengths to form coalitions or social organizations of support possessing sufficient strength to defeat opponents. Eventually, social norms and consensus generate laws legitimizing the use of force. This concept brings Weber to his final definition of state, "Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[38] In this definition, the author uses human community as a synonym for society. Based on these theories and FM 3-24 definitions it appears that a tribal leader or warlord who maintains a militia to combat enemies and control society forms an effective state and provides governance.

Doctrinal and non-doctrinal definitions demonstrate that governance is a complex mechanism. The UNESCAP definition highlights the various actors and their decisions that contribute to good governance, but lacks the terms society or representation. The US Military definition refers the state that also contains many actors including the people. It defines governance as being representative in nature increasing the number of actors makes the process more complex. Both definitions suggest that multiple actors contribute to governance, but a representative governance or democracy contains the greatest number of actors and is possibly

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[36] Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* [lecture on-line]: available at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/ moriyuki/abukuma/ weber/lecture/politics_vocation.html; Internet; accessed on 20 October 2009, 1.

[37] Ibid., 2.

[38] Ibid., 1.

the most complex. Is a representative or complex form of governance the correct approach for a building or rebuilding a nation?

Is Democracy the Right Answer?

The US chooses to build democratic or representative governments. British colonies in America went to war due to a lack of representation in British government. Since that time, the US has the pursued spreading of democracy throughout the world. McDougall states, "The result in foreign policy was that a newly prideful United States began to measure its holiness by what it did, not just by what it was, and through Progressive Imperialism committed itself, for the first time, to the pursuit of abstractions such as liberty, democracy, or justice."[39] US values tend to favor building democratic or representative governments as reflected in the FM 3.07 definition of governance mentioned in the previous section.

America tends to build what it knows best. It chooses to build governance with institutions in its image despite the fact that foreigners may maintain different values. Huntington states, "America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence America never had to worry about creating a government."[40] Democracy developed with Christian values throughout European history. European colonists brought this concept to the US as it fit with its history, geography, and values. The logic generates a question over the application of an American concept of democracy in a society with a tribal history and Islamic values. Perhaps the American version of good governance is not transferrable to, or even desired by other nations.

Some challenge the effectiveness of democracy, especially in forming a nation. Democracy contains tensions and conflicts or checks and balances to ensure effective power

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[39] Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 121.

[40] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society*, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1996), 7.

sharing through the branches of government. No individual or single branch has sufficient power to overthrow the entire government. Huntington states,

> "When an American thinks about the problem of government building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power. Asked to design a government, he comes up with a written constitution, bill of rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, regular elections, competitive parties – all excellent devices for limiting government."[41]

Democracy may not be the most effective form of governance for a fledging nation. National governments may chose democracy while local and provincial governments may make other choices.

Co-opting provincial and local leadership may be better than removal. In countries such as Afghanistan, religious and geographical boundaries may result in each province maintaining a different form of governance. The Federalist Number 51 argues, "You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."[42] Militaries in a COIN environment may find that they must enable the tribal leader, religious leader, or Warlord in power to maintain authority over the region. Military leadership may disagree with a local leader's methods, but removal will require a larger military presence. It may be less costly to capitalize on the secure environment while creating democratic institutions fostering power sharing. For example, the United States helped the Afghan government disband the Warlord led Northern Alliance in 2006. Afghan law prevented political parties from maintaining militias and the government feared the Alliance might try to overthrow it just as the Alliance assisted the US

[41] James Madison, The Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (New York: Independent Journal, 1788). [Article on-line] available from http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm, accessed 12 November 2009.

[42] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society*, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1996), 7.

Military in overthrowing the Taliban government.[43] With the Northern Alliance disbanded, the Afghan government lacked sufficient security resources to protect its population from the Taliban. Removing the security force inhibited and perhaps jeopardized PRT operations and forced the United States and NATO to provide additional forces filling the security gap created by the Northern Alliance removal.[44]

The state, provincial, or district governance may not mirror the national model. In the US, citizens are accustomed to State governments that generally mirror the national. The county attempts to mirror the state, but perhaps in a reduced capacity that meets society's needs based on population. Countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan rely on tribal, clan, religious leaders, or Warlords for good governance at local levels. A tribal governance process that has functioned for generations may not support a transition to a democratic system.

Before building governance, leaders must determine which types or models suit the nation they desire to build or rebuild. Definitions of governance suggest that a tribal leader or warlord may be effective forms of governance. Leaders may opt to leave the current, but perhaps less than favorable government, or remove it creating a void that may foster an insurgency. The US government chose to remove existing forms of governance in both Iraq and Afghanistan without the necessary training or doctrine to rebuild. The Army identified its oversight and created its COIN doctrine.

FM 3-24 identifies governance as a Line of Operation (LOO) in counter-insurgency operations. It states, "Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy for

[43]Amin Tarzi, Afghanistan: Government Turns its Sights on Northern Warlords [Article on-line] available from Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/10707089.html (accessed 12 January 2010).

[44] After removal of the Northern Alliance and the slow process of generating the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF), the country has seen a resurgence of the Taliban resulting in a costly increase of almost 60,000 additional US Military personnel and 5,000 NATO personnel.

the HN government."[45] The FM 3-24 refers to effective and legitimate governance, without actually defining governance. In the absence of providing a concise definition, the FM recommends essential steps or pillars for the Army or more specifically PRTs to build governance. The governance LOO outlines ten necessary activities or pillars that support a concept of good governance.

The Pillars of Good Governance

The pillars for building governance are the metric for evaluating PRT structural capacity. Multiple organizations suggest principles or pillars for building governance. As a majority of the PRT leaders and their members are military, it seems appropriate to examine their structures using the ten pillars recommended in military doctrine. There are non-military organizations such as USAID and the United Nations that specialize in building governance throughout world. It also seems appropriate to evaluate the ten pillars against policies from those organizations or other military sources producing non-doctrinal handbooks. The evaluation in Figure 1 (below) compares other organizations policies for building governance to the ten pillars from FM 3-24. Figure 1 describes the level each organization's policies appear to support the ten pillars based on definitions for the categories, components, and characteristics used for building governance.

FM 3-24 provides the pillars for building governance, but does not define them. The manual presents all ten pillars in a non-specific order and does not prioritize or emphasize any single pillar over another. It suggests that building good governance requires an equal and simultaneous focus on all ten pillars. Organizing the pillars into categories provides a better understanding of the overall purpose. It seems logical to examine government as the

[45] Department of the Army, *FM 3-24- Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 5-15.

administrative group that generates rules to organize society, the security group that enforces those rules and protects the state, and the representation group that ensures a democratic process. These groups become categories for grouping the random pillars.

Table 1: Military and Non-Military Contributions to Building Governance

FM 3-24 Pillars	PRT Playbook Categories	USAID Components	United Nations Characteristics
Controlling Military and Police Activities	High	High	High
Rule of Law	High	High	High
Justice	High	High	High
Disaster Preparedness and Response	High	High	High
Public Administration	High	High	High
Property Records and Control	Low	Low	High
Public Finance	High	High	High
Civil Information	High	High	High
Historical, Cultural, and Recreational Services	Low	Low	Low
Electoral Process	High	High	High

The ten pillars each fit into the security, administrative, and representation categories. The security category contains four components: controlling military and police activities, establishing and enforcing the rule of law, justice (a judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections), and disaster preparedness and response. The administrative category contains five components: public administration, property records and control, public finance, civil information, and historical, cultural, and recreational services. The representation category contains one component: an electoral process for representative government.

FM 3-24 recommends deferring the complex task of building governance to civil organizations. Non-military agencies within the US government such as the DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) maintain expertise in the area of building

governance and those institutions that support it. Unfortunately, the lack of security or safety in failed states detracts from civil agency efforts.

The USAID operates under the Department of State as a lead agency for developing governance around the world. The agency has worked with Afghan leadership to develop a constitution. The USAID states,

> In the years since the fall of the Taliban, the country has drafted a new constitution and democratically elected the President, Parliament, and Provincial Councils. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is now focused on building its capacity to provide basic services throughout the country, by recruiting competent and credible professionals to public service on the basis of merit; establishing a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels; implementing measurable improvements in fighting corruption, upholding justice and the rule of law; and promoting respect for human rights.[46]

To achieve this goal, the USAID's Democracy and Governance program supports the establishment of key institutions including the Independent Electoral Commission, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the Independent Human Rights Commission. It targets key ministries, including Agriculture, Education, Finance, and Energy and Water, and the Civil Service Commission, to improve their ability to provide basic services nationwide; recruit competent and credible civil servants based on merit; and establish more accountable and transparent public financial management systems.

The USAID maintains standardized program components for building governance similar to the military's pillars. Their policies list eleven components for building governance. [47] Although the language differs, the intent of these components closely mirrors the pillars described in FM 3-24. The components appear to support eight of ten pillars, but do not support the

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[46] USAID Afghanistan, Democracy and Governance, http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.21a.aspx (accessed 17 September 2009).

[47] Ibid., 10. The pamphlet lists the following eleven components of good governance: Strengthen the justice sector, Strengthen the legislative function / legal framework, Strengthen public sector executive functions, Support democratic local government and decentralization, Promote and support credible elections process, Strengthen democratic political parties, Strengthen civil society, Establish and ensure media freedom and freedom of information, Promote and Support anticorruption, Protect human rights, Promote effective and democratic governance of the security sector.

property records and control or historical, cultural, and recreational services pillars of the administrative category. In particular, the eleventh component focuses on promoting and supporting anti-corruption. As Army ethics training focuses on preventing corruption, perhaps it was assumed that this pillar was present throughout the existing ten pillars.

A lack of precise definition for the pillar and the inability of the civilian agencies to carry out its governance building task creates ambiguity when examining PRT structure. FM 3-24.2 addresses the tactical level of counterinsurgency, but also lacks appropriate definitions for the pillars.[48] The field manual builds upon the operational nature of FM 3-24 by providing doctrine for accomplishing the tactical tasks in counterinsurgency. As the operational manual provides pillars for governance, it seems logical that the tactical manual would provide definitions and guidance for carrying out the tasks. However, it does not and the definitions are open for individual interpretation. The descriptive words for most of the pillars seem suitable for understanding their functions.

The PRT Playbook provides similar interpretation, but uses different categories. Playbook concepts are more like doctrine and focused on building capacities of governance. The Playbook states, "The PRT does not act as an alternative to a host nation's government, but rather seeks to improve the governing capacity of the host nation. PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and hence deter agents of instability. The PRT focuses on the elements of stabilization and reconstruction."[49] The PRT Playbook guidance seems ambiguous, suggesting that PRTs do not act as or replace the government, but then suggests it fills a vacuum created by weak governance. Either way, there is little doubt that it suggests the PRT is responsible for reconstructing or building governance.

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[48] Department of the Army, *FM 3-24.2- Tactics in Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009).

[49] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 13. [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 3.

The PRT Playbook recommends five categories for reconstruction: Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, Justice and Reconciliation, Governance and Participation, and Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. The Playbook uses language similar to that used in FM 3-24 to describe the categories. The Playbook places a heavy emphasis on rebuilding basic infrastructural services such as power, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, firefighting, education systems, mortuary services, and environmental control.[50] Rebuilding and managing these services as well as Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being and Economic Stabilization fit into the public administration category. Security, Justice, and Reconciliation fall under the security category. The Playbook categories align with those categories that form the ten pillars in FM 3-24. Similar to USAID's policy, the Playbook does not support the property records and control or historical, cultural, and recreational services pillars of the administrative category. Perhaps UNESCAP policies address those pillars.

UNESCAP operates as a commission under the United Nations and is its lead agency for economic and social development in the Pacific. It both defines and provides eight characteristics for building governance. UNESCAP argues,

> Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.[51]

Although the language and titles for the principles differ from FM 3-24, the detailed definitions provide for an in-depth understanding. The only FM 3-24 pillar not fully described or supported

[50] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 13. [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 3.

[51] UNESCAP, What is Good Governance? [Article on-line] available at http:www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (accessed 26 February 2010). The detailed definitions for each principle allow for a concept comparison with the ten military pillars.

is that of historical, cultural, and recreational services. Overall, the UNESCAP Pillars support those described in FM 3-24.

After examining various organizations' policies for building governance, it appears the only FM 3-24 pillar consistently not supported is that of historical, cultural, and recreational services. As three other organization's policies do not support the pillar, it leaves the question of why did the military add it to FM 3-24? Unfortunately, the FM does not provide an answer, but US Military values both its history and culture and expresses them through recreational activities such as sports competitions and formal functions. These events build esprit-de-corps or pride in the organization. Similarly, cultures throughout world express their national will as they rally around historical revelries every four years during the Olympic Games. Perhaps the military inserted it's own or world cultural values into the pillars for building governance to ensure the populace take pride in the new organization.

The pillars become a metric for evaluating a PRT's structural capacity to build governance. Rather than focusing on PRTs accomplishments, the pillars allow for an examination of their structure as that is where the ability or inability for building good governance rests. This monograph applies the pillars as a metric for examining various US PRTs models used in current operations. Examining the organization's structure does not rely on a study of pre-deployment training that focuses more on PRT's survivability in a combat zone than an individual's job performance. When selecting personnel for PRTs, the DOD and DOS organizations must assume their choices are proficient in their job specialty. As the study focuses on PRT structures, it must also assume individuals filling key positions are proficient in their job specialty.

United States Provincial Reconstruction Team Models

United States Afghanistan PRT Model

The Afghanistan PRT model is a Joint-Interagency team designed for building provincial governance. The model consists of command, administrative, logistical, enablers, and security

components. The five components create a self-contained PRT allowing it to operate independently from other military units.

PRTs currently carry the names of the provinces they support. There is an abundance of literature where PRT names conflict. Some early PRTs adopted the names of the cities where they conducted operations rather than the province they supported. Although the city was normally the provincial capital or the hub of power, it did not reflect an organization designed to support the province. In 2008, the 101st Airborne Division assumed the Joint Task Force mission and ensured all PRTs carried their provincial designation. There were six PRTs renamed; Bagram to Parwan, Qalat to Zabol, Sharana to Paktika, Gardez to Paktya, Jalalabad to Nangahar, and Asadabad to Konar. Unfortunately, not all government organizations have adopted the provincial names so reports from as late as 2009 show the original nomenclature.

There are several different PRT models operating in Afghanistan as seen in Appendix 1. Ten of the twelve PRTs operate under US Army commanders in Regional Commands (RC) East and Capital. Farah and Zabol operate under International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) control in RCs West and South.[52] The discrepancies in PRT structure between provinces demonstrate differences related to security levels in particular provinces and additional non-governance focused missions.

The Farah and Zabol PRTs have more personnel due to mission creep. Mission creep is a non-doctrinal term army units generally reserve for the process of adding additional tasks to the primary mission. The Farah and Zabol PRTs under ISAF are responsible for running Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) housing themselves and other ISAF units. This additional task is a major distraction for reconstruction operations. The FOB administrative mission earns the PRTs ten extra personnel. Unfortunately, the additional logistical, contract, and especially security support

[52] Arnold Fields, Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Office of the SICGAR, 2009), 54.

requirements exceed the PRT's structure. Mission creep in the installation security arena has left the PRTs with few available security forces for reconstruction missions and has detracted from the PRT's capabilities.

Panjshir and Parwan require fewer security forces than other provinces. Security levels vary by province across Afghanistan. Both Panjshir and Parwan are relatively secure provinces. Bagram, the provincial capital of Parwan houses one of the largest concentrations of US Military forces in Afghanistan.[53] This allows the Parwan PRT to capitalize on the security presence and other resources in Bagram. The governor of Panjshir prides himself on his strong provincial security force that has protected it from criminal and insurgent attacks.[54] The high security levels result in fewer security personnel as evident under the security platoon portion of Appendix 1.

The eight remaining PRTs form the core organization this study refers to as the Afghanistan PRT model. Khowst, Konar, Nangahar, Ghazni, Pakeya, Paktika, Laghman and Nuristan all have identical structural requirements. Each of these organizations consist of roughly eighty-nine personnel with eighty-four in the military component, two linguists, and up to three interagency civilians.[55] Figure 1 demonstrates the military component of the PRT and does not include linguists or interagency civilians. The military, civilian, and linguist organization described comprises the Afghanistan PRT model.

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[53] Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy Commander U.S. Central Command. [Statement on-line] from http://www.DOD.gov/DODgc/olc/docs/testFallon070417.pdf (accessed 22 January 2010). Bagram Airbase is the main Aerial Port of Entry (APOE) for all personnel entering and departing Afghanistan. During PRT formation, it housed a division headquarters, fighter squadrons, engineers, and support units totaling over 7000.

[54] Global Security.org, Coalition Forces, Local Government Thwart IED in Panjshir. [Article on-line] Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/05/mil-080527-afpn04.htm (accessed 14 January 2010). There are several more examples of the exemplary relationship including the fact that the Provincial Governor provides the PRT security.

[55] Arnold Fields, Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Office of the SICGAR, 2009), 54. In table 19 – Civilian and Military Personnel in U.S. led PRTs in Afghanistan, the military number are higher than authorized and the table does not account for linguists.

The Afghanistan PRT is a joint service organization capitalizing on skill sets throughout the DOD. Figure 1 breaks down the Naval (dark grey), Air Force (light grey), and Army (white) contributions to the PRT structure. The Army National Guard Security Forces (SECFOR), Reserve (Civil Affairs), and Active Army (S3, S4, and NCOIC) comprise the Army contribution. All PRTs consist of either Air Force and Army or Navy and Army personnel with only Nuristan containing a mix of all services. Service contributions may signify a willingness of the Joint community to accept and support the Afghanistan PRT concept. For the purpose of this study, the service or component providing a critical skill set is not important. It assumes that individuals filling structural requirements are proficient at their skill set.

The Afghanistan PRT Model is a self-contained organization. The PRT consists of five primary sections; command, administrative, logistics, SECFOR, and enablers. The command and enabler sections for the action arm providing most of the governance building efforts. The SECFOR section secures PRT movements and assists with installation force protection. The administrative and logistical sections provide life support sustaining the PRT. Life support sections are also capable of traveling off base to assist with governance building efforts. All sections work together ensuring the PRT is accomplishing its governance-building mission. This structure makes the Afghanistan PRT a self-sustaining organization.

The commander provides a common vision for the team and is the final decision maker. As a military organization, the PRT follows the Unity of Command concept. Interagency advisors and other staff members contribute to the commander's vision. The commander also ensures the joint-interagency PRT functions as a team.

The command team contains two additional components. Linguists comprise the first component while interagency personnel the second. Category (CAT) 2 linguists are integral to the Afghanistan PRT structure. There are two types of linguists available to the PRT. The current PRT structure requires three CAT 2 linguists. CAT 2 refers to linguists who possess a secret

security clearance and are U.S. citizens. For additional support, PRTs have the ability to contract local national linguists. As local national linguist's loyalties may belong to organizations other than the U.S., PRTs limit their use and access to sensitive information. Therefore, the local national linguists cannot be relied on, making the CAT 2 linguist is an integral member of the PRT.

The interagency civilian personnel form the second component of the command team. Integral to the Afghanistan PRT structure, interagency civilians bring an expertise not found in military organizations. The DOS provides a diplomatic officer who is responsible for providing policy and political guidance to the PRT based on diplomatic goals outlined by the Chief of Mission (COM).[56] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides a development officer with an expertise in understanding the social and economic aspects of instability and insecurity. This officer provides planning, design, and implementation of reconstruction and development activities in support of politically derived objectives.[57] As the Afghanistan society is eighty percent agrarian, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides one of the more critical contributions. This office focuses on assessing, designing, and implementing agricultural programs to support economic growth necessary to support strong governance.

The administrative section contains the staff elements that advise the commander and manage the PRT. The section tracks and directs PRT operations in an enemy environment. It contains intelligence, operations, communications, and personnel sections. The intelligence section provides critical enemy and route analysis throughout the province as most PRT operations occur "outside the wire" or off the Forward Operating Base (FOB). The operations

[56] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 25.

[57] Ibid.

officer or S3, a combat arms officer uses this analysis to generate movement plans, direct the SECFOR platoon, and allocate Quick Reaction Force (QRF) assets. The S3 and PRT senior non-commissioned officer also provides oversight for the SECFOR platoon in addition to their normal duties.

The logistics section generally operates on the FOB providing the PRT's life support functions. There four subsections are medical, maintenance, food service, and supply. A Physician's Assistant (PA) leads the medical section and provides immediate care. The maintenance section repairs vehicles, weapons, and generators. The food service section either prepares meals or supervises contractors to ensure the process meets US Army health standards. The supply section maintains accountability of all PRT equipment, supervises contracts, forecasts, and orders all classes of supply to sustain the PRT. The logistics section is critical to the Afghanistan PRT's structure because it provides key life support functions.

The SECFOR platoon is a dedicated security force for the PRT. The platoon comprises almost one-half the PRT's structure. It is generally an infantry platoon or its equivalent. The platoon provides movement, facilities, and perimeter security for all PRT members traveling off the FOB. It also contributes to FOB security and force protection. The SECFOR section is critical to the Afghanistan PRT's structure because it provides the organization the ability to operate outside the wire.

All sections must work together as a self-contained organization to accomplish the PRT's mission. The administrative, logistical, and SECFOR sections support the main effort or enablers, but also assist in operations off the FOB. The enabler section provides most of the governance building capabilities for the self-contained PRT. The senior CA representative generally serves as the Chief of Staff (COS) for the PRT to ensure all staff sections supports the main effort.

Afghanistan PRT Examination

The Afghanistan PRT requires further structural modifications to accomplish its mission. It is necessary to apply the security, administration, and representation categories of governance to the Afghanistan PRT structure. The examination focuses on the pillars of each category and members of the PRT who support those categories.

The PRT structure requires further refinement in the security category. The security category contains four pillars: controlling military and police activities, rule of law, judicial, and disaster preparedness and response. The first pillar is controlling military and police activities. It is reasonable to separate controlling military from police activities as police focus on internal security and the military focuses on border security and national defense. The controlling police activities portion combines with the rule of law, justice, and corrections pillars. The PRT commander, NCOIC, S3, and SECFOR leadership have the abilities to provide leadership and oversight for controlling military activities. After all, the command team and SECFOR already provide this leadership for the PRT.

The remaining security pillars require structural additions and possible modifications. Not all Army Military Police (MP), Air Force Security Police (SP), or Navy Master at Arms (MA) have experience in law enforcement and corrections. In both the Army and Navy, law enforcement and corrections branches carry a different Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designator.[58] The structural requirements do not specify a MOS. As an E6, the MP NCO is junior in grade and may not have sufficient training to understand full law enforcement or corrections operations. A senior NCO or company grade officer may provide better administrative oversight

[58]Army Military Police [Information on-line] found at http://www.mos-army-mil-info.com/pages/mos/police/police-mos.html (accessed 24 January 2010). Army MPs have two MOSs, 31B designates combat MPs while 31E describes corrections (detentions) specialists.

in these areas. Ultimately, rule of law is one of four Civil Affairs (CA) functional areas and its generalists should enhance the effort .[59]

The CA section has the ability to compensate for MP shortfalls, train the junior NCO, and work with Host Nation (HN) authorities. FM 3-05.40 states, "Rule of Law pertains to the fair, competent, and efficient application and fair and effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of a society through impartial legal institution and competent police and corrections systems. The functional area includes judge advocates trained in international and comparative law as well as CA specialists in related subjects."[60] The study as well as FM 3-05.40 assumes that CA generalists are working towards becoming specialists and possess some knowledge in specific functional areas. A balanced team should be able to contribute to both the rule of law, employment of police, and corrections pillars.

The CA governance function supports the disaster preparedness and response pillar. FM 3-05.40 states, "Capabilities of the Governance section are to – advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems)."[61] CA personnel with public safety and management skills should be able to support the disaster preparedness and response pillar.

The most evident shortfall in the security category is the judicial contribution to the rule of law and judiciary pillars. FM 3-05.40 maintains that the Judge Advocate (JA) Corps provides legal expertise to commanders and administers the military judiciary system. It counters this

[59] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-4. The field manual lists six core functional areas for CA specialist, but only four for reserve component CA teams. PRTs consist of reserve component teams usually comprising generalists as opposed to specialists. They focused on Rule of Law, Infrastructure, Governance, and Public Health and Welfare. Active CA units add Economic Stability and Public Education and Information functional areas.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 2-12.

claim on the following page stating the JA officers by mandate serve all armed service officers.[62] This is a misapplication of the regulation and only guarantees CA officers representation after an accusation of wrongdoing. The PRT CA section does not provide internal JA support. The Afghanistan PRT structure also does not include JA representation and therefore falls short on its contribution to the judiciary pillar.

The PRT structure requires further augmentation in the administrative category. The administrative is the largest category, containing five pillars for building good governance. The pillars are public administration, property records and control, public finance, civil information, and historical, cultural, and recreational services. With augmentation from the supply sections, the CA component has the ability to support the public administration, property records and control, and historical, cultural, and recreational services. The PRT Information Operations (IO) officer with assistance from the CA section provides expertise in Civil Information. The Afghanistan PRT does not contain the necessary structure to support the public finance pillar of the administrative category.

The CA governance function supports public administration. FM 3-05.40 states, "The governance section consists of functional specialists in public administration and services…some skills required in this section include public administration, public safety administration and managers, environmental administrators and managers, and other administrators whose civilian duties include upper level management of any public institution at various levels (city / county / local / state / federal)."[63] Based on doctrine, CA personnel have the necessary skills to support the public administration pillar.

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[62] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-9. By statue, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Army and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army.

[63] Ibid., 2-12.

The CA public health and welfare function supports the historical, cultural, and recreational services pillar. FM 3-05.40 states, "Some skills required in this section include…museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and archives…and provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/HN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social and mental well-being of the society and the possible effects of CMO."[64] The public health and welfare function does not directly address the recreational services portion of the pillar. CA team members should be able to support the historical and cultural services portions of the pillar.

Although civil information is a CA core competency, the PRT Information / Operations (I/O) officer also supports the civil information pillar. I/O officers operate in the Global Information Environment (GIE) containing news media and information infrastructures.[65] The I/O officer and CA generalist possess the expertise to oversee the civil information pillar.

The PRT supply section supports the property records and control pillar. The supply section consists of an officer, midgrade NCO, and a specialist. The Army trains and charges supply personnel with maintaining records and property accountability. They demonstrate their expertise through both paper and paperless accountability of thousands of pieces of equipment assigned to each PRT. Their systems expertise and attention to detail should be sufficient to oversee the property records and control pillar.

The PRT does not contain the necessary structure to support the public finance pillar. The FM states, "Some of the capabilities of the Economic Stability Section are: advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury

[64] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-14.

[65] Department of the Army, *FM 100-6, Information Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-2 to 1-4.

operations; advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal polices, and labor)."[66] Reserve Component CA brigades and battalions do not possess an economic stability section. As CA contributions to the Afghanistan PRT are from the reserve component, they do not contain the structure necessary to support the public finance pillar.

The Afghanistan PRT structure fails to account for the Representation Category. This category contains the electoral process pillar. As military organizations are more autocratic than democratic, it is difficult to find a MOS for supervising the elections process. The International Elections Committee (IEC) provided expert advisors to help train PRTs to supervise provincial election sites for recent Afghanistan national elections. The problem with this approach is that election fraud can occur with the development of rules and regulations on voter qualifications, during the voter registration process, or at the ballot box. The fraud process has the potential to begin months or even years before the election day, but the focus seems to be only at the ballot box. The PRT structure does not account for a representative with elections expertise and fails to contribute to the electoral process pillar.

This examination demonstrates the Afghanistan PRT structure does not fully support current doctrine for building good governance. The structure does not support the judicial, public finance, or the electoral process pillars. The Afghanistan PRT model is only capable of fully supporting seven of the ten pillars for building good governance. The governance LLO contains six objectives for attaining the military end state. The PRT is incapable of accomplishing the objective of re-establishing the justice system. It has a limited capability of accomplishing the objectives of support and secure elections. It is apparent that through doctrine, the DOD has developed objectives for the Afghanistan PRT. The objectives assigned to the PRT exceed its

[66] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-10.

current structural capabilities. DOD and DOS must augment the Afghanistan PRT structure in order for it to accomplish its mission.

United States Iraq Model

> While PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have similar missions, their structures greatly vary. Though former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad is credited as introducing PRTs to Iraq from his previous assignment as Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq PRTs bear little resemblance to their Afghanistan counterparts.[67]

Ambassador Khalilzad may have introduced the PRT concept to Iraq, but the organizational structure was lost in translation. There are between eleven and eighteen provincial PRTs and thirteen local-level embedded PRTs.[68] All eleven provincial-level PRT models are DOS-led organization. The embedded PRT (ePRT) models are also DOS-led, but do not function at the provincial level. Neither Iraqi model constitutes a military led Provincial Reconstruction Team.

The ePRT is not a provincial level organization. The PRT Playbook states, "In support of the military surge in Baghdad and PRT-Ramadi, the newly established embedded PRTs (ePRTs) work at the subprovincial level assisting districts and municipalities in reconnecting with their provincial governments."[69] The model generally consists of eight to twelve civilians assigned to a

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[67] Robert M Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2005). [Paper On-line] available from U.S. Institute for Peace at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf (accessed 22 October 2009).

[68] Arnold Fields, *Message from the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the SICGAR, 2009), 57. Other literature sources such as the GAO-09-86R printed in 2008 refers to 18 PRTs and only 13 ePRTs. The exact numbers vary by source. This monograph uses the SICGAR report.

[69] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 65. According to the Playbook, the ePRT supports the BCT/RCT counterinsurgency efforts…it represents the civilian contribution to the surge. The ePRT augments a BCT of over 3400 army soldiers generating an exceptionally large footprint.

Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or Marine Corps Regiment with a poorly defined mission.[70] Perhaps renaming these organizations district and municipal reconstruction teams (DRT or MRTs) would eliminate confusion as to their role. As the monograph focuses on the provincial level, it will not examine sub-provincial organizations.

The Iraqi PRT's mission statement is more robust than that of its Afghanistan counterpart. The Playbook states, "The PRT program is a priority joint Department of State (DOS) / Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to bolster moderates, support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency."[71] The mission statement leaves Iraqi PRTs responsible for the economic as well as governance lines of operation found in FM 3-24. For comparison to the Afghanistan PRT model, it is necessary to examine the PRT structure based only on the governance line of operation.

Iraqi PRTs are not self-contained organizations. Although not considered embedded, most Iraq PRTs are located on military FOBs in or near provincial capitals.[72] They rely on military assets to provide a secure environment, lodging, sustenance, and communications. Iraqi PRTs also rely on the military for Personal Security or Military Movement Teams (MMTs) when operating off the FOB or "outside the wire". The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) states, "Interagency dispute over whether the US Military would provide protection, combined with a worsening security atmosphere in much of Iraq in 2005 to 2006, led to many PRTs being virtually paralyzed, unable to deploy from FOBs for prolonged periods of

[70] Robert Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affair, 2008), 48.

[71] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 61.

[72] Robert Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affair, 2008), 14.

time."[73] DOD and DOS signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in 2007 where the military promised to provide escorts for travel off the FOB. Escort is an understatement for the responsibility DOD accepted. The military escorts must analyze enemy activities, plan safe routes, and coordinate movement. Additionally, a parent organization must maintain vehicles and weapons, provide ammunition, and perform additional life support and logistical functions. The Iraqi PRT structure does not support a self-contained or stand-alone organization. It requires a battalion or BCT level organization for support. Factoring these organizations into the PRT's structure would make it a self-sustaining structure, but generate a footprint of 650 to 3,650 personnel.

The Iraqi PRT is a DOS civilian-led organization supported by DOD assets. The PRT consists of approximately 10 to 45 personnel led by a U.S. Foreign service officer.[74] DOD directly augments the PRT structure with between 4 and 20 civil affairs personnel and a deputy team leader. The deputy team leader is generally the ranking CA team member. DOD also provides a personal security or military movement team. Unlike the Afghanistan PRT model, structural diagrams and supporting documentation do not specify a size for this team. The size and availability of the security element also vary by command. Under the clear, hold, and build COIN strategy, a ground commander has to sacrifice personnel from the clear and hold mission to provide security for a PRT to build. Each PRT maintains a different size security element. These factors make it difficult to determine a structure for an organization to identify as an Iraqi PRT.

A CA representative generally acts as the Deputy Team Leader (DTL). The Deputy Team Leader (DTL) is the senior military member and approving authority for the security of all PRT

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[73] United States Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction: SIGIR-07-015(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2007), 5. [Report On-Line] Avaiable from http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 22 October 2009).

[74] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 66.

off-site and convoy operations.[75] A CA company provides the military structure for the PRT and by default, the senior team member becomes the DTL. The DTL becomes or appoints a subordinate CA officer as the military liaison to the supported BCT for coordinating PRT operations, communications, logistics, and movements off the FOB.

The Iraqi PRT model consists of four primary groups. The governance, rule of law, economic, and infrastructure groups all focus on operations assisting the Iraqi provincial government. None of these groups appears to contain assets that would help make the Iraqi PRT self-contained.

The Iraqi PRT model must deploy to an area with a military presence. It lacks the structure to provide its own security. The PRT relies on staff functions of a BN or higher-level organization. A typical combat arms BN averages 600 and a brigade approximately 3,400 personnel. The linkage between the Iraq PRT and military security forces is essential for the former to perform its mission. This linkage effectively expands the Iraqi PRT model to between 650 and 3,450 personnel.

Iraqi PRT Examination

The examination process will follow the same framework outlined for Afghanistan PRT model, but attempt to eliminate redundancy. The Iraqi PRT model contains an equal or greater number of CA officers than its Afghanistan counterpart. Rather than reexamining the CA contribution, the examination focuses on remaining structural differences that support building good governance. As stated above, the model's structure reflects the DOS's mission statement that exceeds the governance LLO found in FM 3-24. The governance, rule of law, and economic groups align with military and USAID doctrine for building good governance. The examination must assume that DOS will provide qualified personnel to meet the capabilities outlined for each

[75] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 67.

group. These steps and assumptions addressed will truncate the examination by focusing only on DOS contributions.

From the Afghanistan examination, CA personnel supported five of ten pillars of good governance. CA doctrine demonstrated its personnel support establishing and enforcing the rule of law and disaster preparedness and response from the security category and public finance, civil information, and historical, cultural, and recreational services pillars from the administrative category. CA doctrine supported the police portion of the controlling military and police activities pillar. This leaves the judicial from security, public finance and property records and control from public administration, and an electoral process for representative government pillars for DOS elements to oversee.

The DOS economic group supports the public finance pillar. One functional area for this group is to assess provincial finances, banking, and business. This functional area addresses both public and private finance and appears to bridge the gap between the two. The DOS economic group appears to have been designed for the sole purpose of supporting the public finance pillar.

Public Diplomacy Officer (PDO) supports the civil information pillar. The position description states, "The PDO is a full-time public diplomacy professional dedicated to effectively communicating the good work of the PRT and assisting in developing a public outreach capacity in the provincial government."[76] Although not described in detail, the examination assumes that the PDO is familiar with public media and civil information. The CA component of the PRT also supports the civil information pillar and the addition of the PDO strengthens the team.

The Rule Of Law (ROL) group supports the ROL and judicial pillars. This group focuses on three functional areas: the provincial role in courts, provincial involvement in police force and fire brigades, and provincial role in detention facilities. More specifically, the rule of law

[76] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 25.

coordinator "is responsible for coordinating ROL initiatives at the provincial level focusing on public law enforcement; a fair civil and criminal judicial system; citizens' equal address to the Iraqi judicial system and legal representation; and a humane corrections system, as well as a range of issues that will assist Iraq in transitioning into a effective ROL society."[77] The rule of law coordinator and group has the expertise to oversee the ROL and judicial pillars. The CA component of the PRT also supports the ROL pillar. The ROL group alone supports the judicial pillar.

The Iraqi PRT structure does not fully support military doctrine for building good governance. It is essential to remember that this organization is civilian led and under no obligation to conform to military doctrine. Nevertheless, the pillars as examined in the governance section are similar. The structure does not support the military portion of the controlling military and police activities pillar from the security category, the property records and control pillar of the administrative category, or the electoral process pillar of the representation category. The Iraqi PRT model is only capable of fully supporting seven of the ten pillars for building good governance. The governance LLO contains six objectives for attaining the military end state. The PRT is incapable of accomplishing the objective of support and secure elections. It is apparent that through doctrine, the DOD has developed objectives for the Iraqi PRT, that exceed its current structural capabilities. DOD and DOS must augment the Iraqi PRT structure in order for it to accomplish its mission.

Comparing PRTs

It became difficult to compare civilian-led Iraqi PRTs and their military-led counterparts in Afghanistan. There does not appear to be an interagency doctrine for generating or employing

[77] Center For Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook* (Ft Leavenworth: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). [Handbook on-line] available from the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at http://call.army.mil (accessed 18 September 2009), 68.

PRTs. Military doctrine became the basis for examining both military and civilian PRT models. Based on this doctrine, neither PRT model appears to contain the structured necessary to build governance. Figure 2 demonstrates each PRT's ability to support the pillars with a "Yes" while highlighting those they cannot support with a "No".

Table 2: PRT's Ability to Support the Ten Pillars of Building Governance

FM 3-24 Pillars	Afghanistan PRT	Iraq PRT
Controlling Military and Police Activities	Yes	Police Only
Rule of Law	Yes	Yes
Justice	No	Yes
Disaster Preparedness and Response	Yes	Yes
Public Administration	Yes	Yes
Property Records and Control	Yes	No
Public Finance	No	Yes
Civil Information	Yes	Yes
Historical, Cultural, and Recreational Services	Yes	Yes
Electoral Process	No	No

The Afghanistan PRT model does not posses the structure doctrine requires for building governance. The PRT lacks the expertise to support the justice, public finance, or electoral process pillars. The justice pillar is critical to the security category and directly linked to the control police and rule of law pillars. The police enforce the rule of law and arrest citizens. Without a judicial system, due process and timely trails may not be available and results in overcrowded detention facilities. The public finance pillar is critical to the administrative category and directly linked to the civil information and property records and control pillars. The pillar is responsible for taxation. It relies on records from the property records and control pillar to generate income through taxation to support the remaining nine pillars of governance. This process relies on civil information to ensure transparency and prevent corruption. The electoral

process pillar supports the representative category. If the populace views elections as illegitimate, it will not support the elected officials. The Afghanistan PRT model lacks the ability to provide oversight to pillars in each category. As demonstrated, these shortfalls make it difficult for the PRT to assist in establishing governance or accomplish its mission.

Despite the fact that the Iraq PRT model contains almost four times as many civilian experts as the Afghan model, it still does not posses the structure doctrine requires for building governance. The Iraq PRT model does not support the controlling military activities, property records and control, or electoral process pillars. The military focuses on securing a nation's borders, but also provides resources such as labor in response to internal disasters. The inability to support the controlling military activities pillar leaves a nation vulnerable to outside aggressors and weakens the nation's ability to support the disaster preparedness and response pillar of the security category. The property records and control pillar of the administrative category includes accounting for land ownership and personnel allowing for taxation to support governance. The inability to support this pillar results in a breakdown of the taxation process and governance as a whole. Like the Afghanistan PRT model, the Iraqi model does not support the electoral process pillar of the representative category. The shortfalls in the Iraqi PRT structure also make it difficult for the PRT to assist in establishing governance or accomplish its mission.

It has become obvious through this comparison that all ten pillars have equal value in building governance. The pillars are mutually supporting and a failure of any single pillar may result in failure of governance as a whole. It is not possible to discuss the ability of a PRT to support building governance by the number of pillars it supports. A PRT must contain the structure to support all ten pillars in order to accomplish its mission. Therefore, neither the Afghanistan nor Iraq PRT models contain the structure to build governance. Correcting this problem may require a new PRT model and the Afghanistan PRT provides the structure necessary to begin this process.

Unlike the Iraq PRT model, the Afghanistan model is a self-contained organization. The Afghanistan PRT has the ability to conduct operations independent of other civilian or military organizations. Iraqi PRTs require a military organization to provide security and life support functions. The Afghanistan PRT model contains the elements necessary to secure and support itself. Its structure allows the Afghanistan model to deploy and conduct operations with fewer than 100 personnel while the Iraqi model requires over 3,400. The self-contained Afghanistan PRT model provides a lower cost (in terms of finances and force structure) approach to building good governance. Perhaps the Afghanistan PRT model with its limited ability to build governance, but its self-contained structure could combine with the elements of the Iraqi PRT responsible for the judicial and public finance pillars. This combination coupled with an element that focuses on the electoral process pillar would form a new self-contained PRT capable of supporting all ten pillars for building governance.

Conclusion

This study began with a question of: "Do US PRT models contain the structure necessary for building good governance?" After applying the pillars for building governance from FM 3-24, it would appear that neither model contains the structure necessary to build governance. However, the Afghanistan PRT model's self-contained structure allows it to operate independent of other military organizations. The self-contained structure requires an organization of less than one-hundred personnel reducing both financial and more importantly, the force structure costs. The cost savings of the smaller model may be an appropriate template to create a new PRT fully capable of building governance.

Focusing solely on the ability to build governance, both PRT models contain different strengths. Combining those strengths by placing the Iraqi model's rule of law and economic development groups into the Afghanistan model may be the best answer. Such a combination would generate a more suitable organization for building governance. This organization would

also require additional augmentation to support the electoral process pillar. The recommended changes would generate a self-contained PRT capable of supporting good governance as defined by FM 3-24.

In attempting to compare U.S PRTs from Iraq and Afghanistan, it became obvious that there is a lack of Joint-interagency doctrine for generating or employing PRTs. The Joint-interagency community should create doctrine using the pillars for building governance form FM 3-24 as a basis for employing the PRTs. More research may be necessary to combine Army doctrine and interagency policy to define each pillar. New doctrine should also incorporate a Joint-interagency manning document that follows the recommendations form the previous paragraph. Combining COIN doctrine and the recommended Joint-interagency manning document will create a PRT structurally capable of accomplishing its mission.

This study also sought to find a definition for good governance as a means of evaluating PRTs. FM 3-07 (*Stability Operations*) provides a definition for governance that relies on an understanding of the state. Non-doctrinal theories provide a sufficient definition for the state that may provide more clarity for future doctrine. After combining doctrinal and non-doctrinal definitions, it became obvious that good governance varies with history, culture, and geography. Good governance for Iraq is different from that in Afghanistan or the United States. FM 3-24 (*Counterinsurgency Operations*) and USAID identify pillars or functions that support building governance. The pillars support building institutions that support governance. The army's definition should expand to include institutions it promotes building. As history, culture, and geography are not always conducive to building a representative or participatory governance, it should also make this task optional. The recommended definition should state that governance is,

> The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and institutions, by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. When possible, it should include the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. The state includes all actors in the decision-making process including Warlords, tribal, clan, and religious leaders that successfully

claim the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.

Good governance bridges two separate types of operations, stability and counterinsurgency. Stability doctrine provides definitions for good governance, but does not prescribe how to build it. Counterinsurgency doctrine provides the pillars for building good governance, but fails to provide a definition. It becomes necessary to combine doctrine from both types of operations to understand the process of building governance. Perhaps the similarities between the two operations require further research to determine the possibility of a future combination generating one doctrinal manual.

Finally, the study offers JFCOM avenues for research to make PRTs a doctrinal CIVMIL organization. The Afghanistan PRT structural document and the recommendations outlined provide the necessary background to generate new or update existing doctrine. The lack of doctrine containing a detailed PRT manning structure and objectives makes mission accomplishment difficult. JFCOM needs to either create a new manual dedicated to PRT operations or update current doctrine. At a minimum, it must incorporate the Governance LOO and ten pillars into joint doctrine to provide guidance for joint organizations such as the PRTs. Doctrinal solidification should ensure future resourcing and that PRTs are an instrumental part of an adaptive force, best structured for current and future conflicts.

Appendix 1: Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Structural Chart

	GRADE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
PRT COMMANDER	O-5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PRT NCOIC	E-8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PRT Linguists		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Inter-Agency (DOS,USAID, USDA)		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Administrative													
PRT S1: GRADE E7 42A PREFERRED	E-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PRT S2 OFFICER	O-3	1	1										1
PRT S2 NCO	E-7	1	1										1
PRT S2	O3 or E7			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
PRT S3	O-3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PRT S4	O-2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
INFORMATION OPERATIONS	O-3 or E7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COMMUNICATIONS NCO	E-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
PRT HQ RTOS	E-4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
PRT HQ DRIVERS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
		14	14	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
Logistics													
SUPPLY NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SUPPLY SPECIALIST	E-4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
FOOD SERVICE NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1
MAINTENANCE NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
WHEELED VEHICLE MECHANICS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1
GENERAL MEDICAL PROVIDERS	TBD	2	2										
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT	O-3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MEDICAL NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
MEDICAL SERGEANT	E-5	1	1										
MEDICAL SPECIALISTS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
FUEL NCOIC	E-6	1	1										
FUEL NCO	E-5	1	1										
FUEL SPECIALISTS	E-4	2	2										
		19	19	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	5	12	9

Appendix 1: Continued

	GRADE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Security Forces (SECFOR)													
PLATOON LEADER	O-2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PLATOON SERGEANT	E-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
DRIVERS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
GUNNERS	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
SQUAD LEADER	E-6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	4	1
TEAM LEADER	E-5	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	2
AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN	E-4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	2
RIFLEMAN	E-4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	2
GRENADIER	E-4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	4	8	2
		42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	24	42	15
Enablers													
CA TEAM LEADER	O-3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CA TEAM SERGEANT	E-7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CA TEAM NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CA TEAM SPC	E-4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CM OPS LEADER	O-4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CM OPS FUNC SPC	O-3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CM OPS GENERALIST	O-3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CM OPS NCOIC	E-8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CM OPS NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ENGINEER NCO/OFFICER	O3 or E7	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
CIVIL ENGINEER													
EOD NCOIC	E-7	1	1										
EOD NCO	E-5	1	1										
MP, MA, SP NCO	E-6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MP, MA, SP SPC	E-4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
		17	17	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	14
Totals by PRT		94	94	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	59	84	53

The chart depicts the structural or manning requirements for the 12 different Afghanistan PRTs. Names and locations have been removed or security purposes. The colors demonstrate a service's contribution with Navy blue, Air Force teal, and Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard green. The Afghanistan PRT model described uses the structure found in PRTs 3 through 9 and 11.

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